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Zhiyuan Wang
Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Binghamton
(Forthcoming in China: an International Journal)

Abstract: Legislative power in China is centralized to an unusual degree. This arrangement is
both positively and normatively significant, but has received little attention in prior
scholarship. We devise a novel method for analyzing the consequence of centralization by
examining provincial rate setting for the vehicle and vessel tax (VVT). Because all provinces
have assigned VVT revenue and VVT administration to sub-provincial governments,
provincial rate-setting represents centralized, not decentralized, decision-making. Using
spatio-econometric analyses, we find that provincial tax rate choices fail to reflect local
economic and demographic conditions and display traces of tax mimicking. Both support the
hypothesis that provincial officials lack information and incentives to make effective policy.
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Introduction
A most fundamental feature of China’s current legal and political system is a high degree
of legislative centralization. The feature has two basic manifestations. First, within the
central-provincial relationship, the central government possesses much greater legislative
power. This is illustrated by the reservation of legislative power to the central government for
several broad categories of policy in the Law on Legislation, 1 but more importantly,
characterizes the disparate laws and regulations operative in a wide array of policy areas.2
Second, relatively few sub-provincial governments have legislative power. At present, only 49
quasi-provincial and prefecture-level jurisdictions can enact local statutes and regulations, 3
whereas there are overall 333 prefecture-level, 2,856 county-level and 40,906 township-level
jurisdictions. According to Law on Legislation, local statutes (difang fagui) and government
regulations (difang zhengfu guizhang) are the only forms of local rules with general
applicability that have a formal legal effect. 4 Therefore, congressional bodies and executive
offices in most municipal governments, and all county and lower-level governments, do not
have lawmaking power. People’s congresses at most sub-provincial jurisdictions are thus not
“legislatures” but mere electoral and quasi-governing bodies, despite the constitution’s
recognition of them as “seats of state power”.5
Surprisingly, such a core feature of Chinese legal institutions has received little analysis
in either legal or social scientific scholarship. The neglect is particularly remarkable in the
social scientific literature, where it has been long recognized that, in terms of administrative
and spending responsibilities, China is a highly decentralized state. In 2008, direct
expenditures by the central government represented only 21.42% of total public expenditures.
Moreover, provincial governments generally make only between 25% and 30% of
sub-national public expenditures, leaving well over half of total public expenditures to
sub-provincial governments. This high level of sub-national expenditures has been the
historical pattern for several decades. 6 The paradoxical co-existence of high legislative
centralization and high administrative decentralization implies that very substantial policy
discretion is exercised by sub-provincial authorities, but such decisions must of necessity take
place outside the legislative system. 7 The combination has nonetheless elicited little
commentary. 8
1

The Law on Legislation (2000), Article 8.
For current arrangements of legislative centralization in tax policymaking, for instance, see Wei Cui,
“Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation,” World Tax Journal 3 (2011): 455-80. .
3
These are located in 27 provincial capitals, 4 cities that host special economic zones, and 18
“relatively large cities” specially designated by the State Council.
4
The Law on Legislation, Chapter 4.
5
The Constitution, Article 2.
6
Zhou Li-An, Zhuanxing zhongde difang zhengfu: guanyuanjili yu zhili (Local Governments in
Transition: Official Incentives and Governance) (Shanghai: Gezhi Publishing, 2008), pp. 6-7; Li Ping,
eds, Zhongguo zhengfu jian caizheng guanxi tujie (Chinese Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations:
Illustrations and Annotations) (Public Finance and Economic Press, 2006), p. 132.
7
We define the legislative system broadly to include formal executive-branch rulemaking.
8
Zhou offers a brief discussion and cites the current Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei as the first to
discuss this combination in 2006. See Zhou Li-An, Local Governments in Transition: Official
Incentives and Governance, pp. 201-7.
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We believe that this neglect of legislative centralization and its causes and consequences
is unfortunate from both positive and normative perspectives. From a social scientific
perspective, it leaves theories of the Chinese political economy incomplete. The centralization
of legislative power essentially reduces the range of actors who can make law. For a large and
diverse country like China, this restriction is likely to be inefficient, because it is very difficult
for those authorized to make law to gather the information necessary to produce rules that
would suit local circumstances, and because it reduces the incentives of sub-national agents to
offer information relevant for legislation. 9 This basic inefficiency is probably why so few
other countries in the world adopt China’s high degree of legislative centralization, and
implies that the Chinese phenomenon requires specific explanations. Conversely, theories of
Chinese political economy that ignore the phenomenon are likely to miss much else that goes
on as a consequence of it.
Moreover, from a normative perspective, if legislative centralization is inefficient, then
transgressions of this legislative framework—e.g. ultra vires policymaking by local
governments—must be evaluated carefully. In many cases of transgression, what undermines
the rule of law may not be local government officials predisposed to disregard the law, but an
irrational legislative system leaving ultra vires acts inevitable. If one takes centralization for
granted, one may be adopting the wrong normative benchmarks. Unfortunately, we believe
much scholarship on Chinese law precisely subscribes to such wrong benchmarks.
In this paper, we illustrate the importance of studying centralization through an empirical
investigation of how Chinese provincial governments set local tax rates pursuant to
nationally-delegated powers. In particular, we examine two episodes of tax-rate-setting for the
vehicle and vessel tax (VVT) in 2007 and 2011. We exploit the fact that revenue from the
VVT, like the revenue of numerous other small, local taxes, has been assigned in all provinces
to sub-provincial governments, who are also responsible for VVT collection. As a result,
provincial rate-setting constitutes an instance of legislative centralization, even though it
occurs at the sub-national level: the range of decision-makers has been restricted, and
information and incentives relevant to the decisions likely lie at lower levels of government.
In delegating VVT rate-setting power to provinces, the national government signals that it
lacks information to set rates for different parts of the country. Legislative decentralization,
therefore, ought to improve efficiency. We show, however, that because of the lack of
information, incentives, or both, provincial governments were not able, either, to effectively
use their rate-setting power (in the sense of incorporating provincial information in the
choices of tax rates.) Thus the central and provincial governments collectively fail to adopt
appropriate legislation. The detriments of centralization, interestingly, are observed at the
provincial level.
Our paper is the first to analyze the determinants of legislative choices of tax rates by
provincial governments in China. Following recent public finance literature originating in
9

For theories of incentives for agents to provide information, see e.g. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole.
“Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997): 1-29.
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North America and Europe, we look for such determinants both in exogenously given
economic and demographic variables and in potential strategic behavior among provincial
governments (identified through spatial-econometric analysis). However, our hypotheses and
interpretation of the results are motivated primarily by the intuitions about the defects of
over-centralization in legislation outlined above, and not by public finance theory. The claim
that legislative authority in general may be too centralized in China has obvious relevance to
policy fields other than taxation, and our ultimate aim is to motivate further study of this
general claim. For example, we suggest that failures to recognize the excessive legislative
centralization in China has led to confusions in academic and policy discussions, e.g. the
treatment of all sub-national levels of government as “local” and the equation of law with
centralized law. Such confusions in turn lead to erroneous assessments of the relationship
between law and development and the potentials of proposed policies such as imposing a
property tax.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the legal and institutional background
for Chinese provincial tax policymaking and for the particular type of tax, the VVT, which we
study. Section II briefly reviews the existing Chinese literature on sub-national government
tax policymaking, as well as the recent international literature on determinants of choices of
local tax rates. Section III describes the actual processes and outcomes of provincial VVT
rate-setting in 2007 and 2011 and preliminary evidence that provincial governments lacked
the information and incentives to legislate effectively. Section IV statistically tests for
determinants of provincial choices of VVT rates. We find that the variables typically
considered to be determinants of local tax rates offer little predictive power regarding
provincial choices. Section V discusses evidence of strategic interactions among provinces
and its interpretations. Finally, Section VI considers the theoretical and policy implications of
our findings.
I. The Institutional Background of Provincial Tax Policymaking
Since 1994, China’s central government has received a much larger share (now greater
than 50%) of overall tax revenue than its share of national expenditures (now around 20%),
and has thus been in a position to make large transfers to sub-national governments. This is
the result of the 1994 tax reform, which created a nationally uniform set of rules allocating tax
revenue between the national and sub-national governments for different taxes. The allocation
of the sub-national shares of tax revenue among the provincial and lower-tiers of governments,
by contrast, is determined by the provinces themselves. Provincial governments, by being
able to decide on the provincial/sub-provincial divisions of tax revenue, and by being the
direct recipients of central government transfers, can generally cover their direct expenditures
with provincial own revenue and grants from the central government. It is the sub-provincial,
and especially county and township governments, that are most adversely affected by the
“vertical fiscal gap” created by top-heavy revenue receipts and bottom-heavy government
outlays.
In recent years, due to their relative fiscal security, many provinces have allocated
4

revenue from minor taxes (including the VVT) to sub-provincial (i.e. municipal, county, and
township) governments. 10 However, legislative power regarding taxation has remained
centralized. Tax policy discretion—understood as not to include matters of revenue allocation,
which are considered a part of budgetary affairs—can at most devolve to provinces. 11 Even
provincial governments have been authorized to make only certain narrowly circumscribed
decisions with respect to numerous shared and local taxes since 1994. 12
A notable instance of provincial tax policymaking in the last few years is the setting of
tax rates for the VVT. The VVT was created in 2007 by combining two previous small local
taxes. In 2006, on the eve of their replacement by the VVT, these two prior taxes together
generated a mere 0.13% of total national tax revenue and 0.37% of tax revenue claimed by
sub-national governments. The 2007 VVT incrementally broadened the tax base and raised
tax rates. This, along with expanding car ownership and improved tax administration, led to
VVT revenue growth of nearly 400% within 4 years. Still, in 2010, VVT generated only 0.74%
of sub-national tax revenue, and ranked 16th in terms of revenue among 18 types of
nationally-recognized taxes.
Nonetheless, VVT policy received wide attention both in 2007, when the tax was first
implemented through an executive decree, and during 2010 and 2011, when the Law on
Vehicle and Vessel Tax (VVT Law) was debated and ultimately enacted. In 2007, the VVT
was said to be “the first local tax subject to comprehensive reform since the1994 reform of
the tax system, as well as the first tax for which the treatment of domestic and foreign
taxpayers is unified. The wholesale reform of the VVT is conducive to the development and
perfecting of China’s local tax system.” 13 In 2010, the VVT made news again because the
VVT Law was to become the first statutory codification of the rules of a local tax and thus
supposedly represented a milestone in completing the “socialist legal system”. 14 Nor was the
salience of VVT legislation observable only in official propaganda. The 2010 draft VVT Law
received the fourth largest number of public comments among 44 proposed legislation or
legislative amendments for which public comments were solicited since 2005.15
Political salience aside, it should be noted that the VVT’s small size does not detract
10

Budget Department, Ministry of Finance (2006), Zhongguo shengyixia caizhengtizhi 2006
(Sub-Provincial Fiscal Systems) (China Public Finance and Economics Press 2007).
11
This is why provinces, and not lower-level governments, are the agents to whom the central
government delegated VVT rate-setting power, even though VVT revenue does not accrue to
provincial budgets.
12
For a list of limited legislative delegations to provinces to determinate tax base and rates, see Wei
Cui, “Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation,” pp 466-7.
13
“Ershuiheyi difangshuigaigequdexindejinzhan (Two Taxes Combined into One: Local Tax Reform
Achieves New Developments,” Zhongguo shuiwu bao (China Taxation News), 21 Feb. 2008.
14
Tax Policy and Legal Departments, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Property and Transaction
Tax Department of the State Administration of Taxation, “Chechuanshui lifagongzuo zongjie”
(Summary of Vehicle and Vessel Tax Legislation), available at
http://www.mof.gov.cn/preview/shuizhengsi/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201104/t20110411_53502
4.html [23 March 2014].
15
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flcazqyj/node_8195.htm.> [23 March 2014] VVT legislation received
such public attention because car owners pay the VVT: like property taxes on homes in other countries,
the VVT possesses salience for a wide and vocal constituency.
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from its representativeness as an instance of provincial tax policymaking. Even for China’s
largest taxes, the items over which provincial governments have policy discretion all have a
small revenue impact. 16 With the possible exception of rate-setting for the Deed Tax, it is
hard to point to any tax policy item within provincial discretion that gives rise to more
“high-powered” incentives to provincial policymakers than VVT rate-setting. We would also
point out that in the context of the significant fiscal deficit at the lowest levels of government,
lower-level governments and taxpayers can be sensitive to even small taxes. For example, the
very controversial agricultural tax that was abolished in 2005 generated only 1.87% of total
tax revenue in 2001. But because it represented over 12% of county-level budgetary revenue
at the time, its abolition was politically difficult.
Against the above background, the empirical question we aim to answer is: how do
provincial governments go about making tax policy, given that, as in the case of the VVT and
other taxes, they are removed from both the implementation and the impact of their decision?
II. Chinese and International Literature on Local Tax Rate-Setting
There is a growing interest among economists in China in studying local government
pursuit of tax policies. 17 A major research constraint is that, as already stated, the central
government maintains a monopoly over the most important tax legislative decisions.
Substantial local tax policies thus tend not to be reflected in sub-national legislation, but
would instead assume disguised forms, such as tax rebates or grants to taxpayers tied to the
amount of tax payments. It is commonly believed that such disguised policies often defeat the
purposes of national laws and regulations, 18 and that legislative centralization has failed to
stem local tax competition through the offering of unauthorized tax preferences. However,
systematic information about the content of negotiations between low-level governments and
businesses regarding tax rates is difficult to gather.
Currently, a popular device for studying local tax policies is to examine the effective
income tax rates (ETR) of listed companies and infer behavior of government officials from
them. 19 Three comments may be made about this still-burgeoning literature. First, after
16

For example, in deciding the taxable threshold for the value added tax (the largest tax), a provincial
government essentially controls the size of the population of “small taxpayers” in the province that pay
the VAT. In 2008, small taxpayers contributed altogether only 4% of VAT revenue nationally, i.e. just
over 0.1% of total tax revenue. The provincial share of such revenue is even smaller.
17
For a review, see Cao Shujun, Liu Xing, Zhang Wanjun, “Caizheng fenquan, difang zhengfu
jingzheng yu shangshi gongsi shiji shuifu” (Fiscal Decentralization, Local Government Competition
and Effective Tax Rates of Listed Companies), Shijie jingji (World Economy) 4 (2009): 69-83.
18
One study finding that local tax refund policies prohibited by the central government effectively
reduced the effective tax rates of listed companies include Wu Liansheng and Li Chen, “Xianzheng
houfan, gongsi shuifu, yu shuishou zhengce de youxiaoxing” (Tax Refunds, the Corporate Tax Burden
and the Effectiveness of Tax Policy), Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China) 4 (2007):
61-73.
19
See Chen Xiao, Xiao Xing and Wang Yongsheng, “Shuishou jingzheng jiqi zai woguo ziben
shichang de biaoxian” (Tax Competition and Its Manifestation in China’s Capital Market), Shuiwu
yanjiu (Taxation Research) 6 (2003): 18-23 ((purporting to find that corporate ETRs across provinces
tend to converge to a level well below the statutory tax rate, and attributing) the phenomenon to tax
competition); Cao et al, Fiscal Decentralization, Local Government Competition and Effective Tax
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controlling for company-specific characteristics, the existing studies have tended to directly
attribute lower company ETRs to local governmental policy choices in the face of tax
competition. Tax competition, and not local economic and demographic features, is assumed
to drive tax policy. Other potential determinants of local tax policy are not considered. 20 In
other words, existing studies have not been specifically designed to prove the existence of tax
competition. Second, even if tax competition can be plausibly assumed to be a dominant
sub-national tax policy consideration, existing studies fail to address the issue of where
sub-national tax policies are made. After all, company ETRs (and regional gross tax burdens)
can be the result of policies adopted by different levels of sub-national governments. Is it
provinces that engage in tax competition, or counties and cities, or even lower levels of
government? Past studies have avoided this question and instead aggregated the choices of all
possible actors into provincial units. Third, ETRs at the company level and gross tax burdens
in local economies are determined by many factors, and are in significant ways not within
politicians’ control. They are thus very rough indicators of policy choices.
We pursue a very different empirical strategy in this paper. We analyze a set of explicit,
legislative tax policy choices (i.e. VVT rates in 2007 and 2011) made by a well-specified
group of actors (i.e. provincial politicians and bureaucrats). We consider potential
determinants of such choices both in spatial interactions among provincial governments and
in exogenous variables. Such an approach is much more accurate and reliable in analyzing
government behavior. It is also consistent with—and indeed is based on—the recent
international scholarship on the political economy of local tax policy.
Much of the recent international literature on local tax rate-setting has been influenced
by the theory of political “yardstick competition”. 21 According to this theory, local voters,
under situations of information asymmetry regarding the cost of production of public goods,
determine whether local politicians are “good” officials or rent-seeking ones by comparing
the tax rates local politicians choose with those chosen in neighboring jurisdictions. This type
of voter decision-making in turn leads to behavior on the part of political incumbents to mimic
the tax rates adopted by neighboring jurisdictions (or other jurisdictions that they believe local
Rates of Listed Companies (finding that ETRs display an inverted-U shape correlation with the fiscal
dependency of provinces, and interpreting this in terms of provinces’ ability to engage in tax
competition); Li Yuanxu and Song Yuanyang,”Difang zhengfu tongguo suodeshui youhui baohu bendi
qiye me – lai zi zhongguo shangshi gongsi de jingyan zhengju” (Do Local Governments Protect Local
Enterprises through Preferential Income Tax—Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms?) Zhongguo
gongye jingji (China Industrial Economics) 5 (2011): 149-159. Alternatively, some scholars have
chosen measures of gross tax burden to represent regional tax policy. See Li Yongyou and Shen
Kunrong, “Xiaqu jian jingzheng, celuexing caizheng zhengce yu FDI zengzhang jixiao de quyu tezheng”
(Competition among Jurisdictions, Strategic Fiscal Policies, and Regional Characteristics of FDI’s
Growth Achievements), Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research Journal) 5 (2008): 58-69 (income tax paid
per unit of FDI stock ); Yang Xiaoli and Xu Lei, “Zhongguo fenquanxia difangzhengfu FDI
shuishoujingzhengde celuexingjiqi jingjizengzhang xiaoying” (The Strategic Character and Impact on
Economic Growth of Chinese Local Government Tax Competition for FDI), Jingji pinglun (Economic
Review) 3 (2011) (employing ratio of aggregate income tax paid over gross profit of foreign invested
enterprises).
20
It is thus notable that after controlling for provincial economic variables, Yang and Xu, ibid, find no
evidence of strategic interactions among provinces (and thus no direct evidence of tax competition).
21
See T. Besley and A. Case,“Incumbent Behaviour: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick
Competition,” American Economic Review 85(1995): 25–44..
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voters may view as comparable). Much empirical evidence has been produced in support of
the existence of tax mimicking and its underlying cause in political competition. 22 Besides
competition in electoral politics, two other explanations of why politicians may choose local
tax rates by reference to the tax rates of neighboring jurisdictions are (1) tax competition in
the face of factor mobility, and (2) public expenditure spillovers. 23 According to the former,
the fear that businesses and residents may leave one’s jurisdiction forces politicians to keep
tax rates no higher than the tax rates in other jurisdictions that are potential destinations of
business or resident migration. According to the latter, because high public spending in one
jurisdiction may force its neighbors to maintain similar high spending (e.g. good policing in
one county may force neighboring counties to spend more on policing than they would
otherwise), the neighbors may have to adopt similarly high tax rates to maintain the same
level of spending. However, studies so far have tended to produce greater support for the
yardstick competition explanation.
Whatever their causes, geographical patterns in tax rates adopted have been discovered
in many countries, in connection with different taxes, and at different levels of government
(i.e. state, county, municipal, etc.). 24 Perhaps worthy of special mention is a series of studies
conducted with respect to Spain. Like China, Spain is a unitary country which nonetheless has
a relatively high degree of decentralization in government expenditures. But Spanish
municipal governments, of which there are more than 8,000, are fiscally more self-sufficient
than local governments in China, and possess the power to legislate local tax rates. Among the
main local taxes is in fact a motor vehicle tax, which generates 15% of municipal tax revenue
and which possesses structural similarities to the Chinese VVT. Separate studies have found
strong mimicking effects for the tax. 25
Nonetheless, our expectation for finding any of the foregoing types of strategic
interactions in tax rate setting in China is modest. First, the theory of political yardstick
competition has been fruitfully applied to China, 26 but not because politicians (especially not
at the provincial-level) can be voted out of office by local constituencies. Instead, the
competition takes place within the Communist Party cadre appointment system. Tax
22

For example, local governments may mimic more when political competition is more intense. See M.
Allers and J. Elhorst, “Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition among Local Governments in the
Netherlands,” International Tax Public Finance 12 (2005): 493–513. J. Brueckner, “Strategic
Interaction among Governments: an Overview of Empirical Studies,” International Regional Science
Review 6 (2003): 175–188. F. Delgado, S. Lago-Peñas and M. Mayor, “On the Determinants of Local
Tax Rates: New Evidence from Spain,” Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) Working Papers
2011/4.
23
See M. Allers and J. Elhorst, “Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition among Local
Governments in the Netherlands;” F. Revelli, “Testing the Tax Mimicking vs. Expenditure Spill-over
Hypothesis Using English Data,” Applied Economics 33 (2002): 1101-7.
24
These include the U.S., Canada, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, Norway, and the U.K., among others. Note that both federalist and unitary countries are included,
consistent with the general proposition that decentralized tax policymaking can take place in both types
of polities.
25
A. Solé-Ollé, “Electoral Accountability and Tax Mimicking: the Effects of Electoral Margins,
Coalition Government, and Ideology,” European Journal of Political Economy 19 (2003): 685–713;
Delgado et al, “On the Determinants of Local Tax Rates.”
26
See, e.g. Li Hongbin and Zhou Li-An, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive
Role of Personnel Control in China”, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (2005): 1743-62.
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rate-setting is unlikely to be a part of this competition: even though sub-national officials may
be rewarded for overall tax revenue generation, because the tax rates for all of the largest
taxes are decided by the central government, growing the economy and strengthening tax
collection are much more effective for generating tax revenue than rate-setting for small taxes.
There also appears to be no other mechanism of political competition that would involve tax
rate-setting. Second, because provincial expenditure is a small portion of local public good
provision, and because VVT revenue represents 0% of provincial revenue, expenditure
spill-overs (if they exist) are unlikely to result in spatial patterns in provincially-adopted VVT
rates. Finally, while tax competition may play a role in provincial rate setting, we note that
since VVT is such a small tax, it is unlikely to be a factor in decisions of business and
residential locations. A province can set high VVT rates without fearing any outflow of
productive factors. 27
However, a very different explanation for tax mimicking in China, if such mimicking
exists, may be plausible: mimicking is the safest and least costly thing for bureaucrats and
politicians to do when they are incapable of, and/or indifferent to, making appropriate policy.
Mimicking could be the result of shirking, a very common type of bureaucratic behavior. Or it
could be the product of political conformity. Thus any evidence of tax mimicking that could
not be explained by tax competition could still reflect specific features of bureaucratic
behavior. It would also suggest that tax policy has not been made effectively, in the sense that
no policy information unavailable to the central government has been incorporated into
provincial decision-making. Therefore, we designed our empirical strategy to capture
potential spatial interactions in provincial VVT rate-setting.

III. VVT Rate-Setting: Processes and Outcomes
The VVT Provisional Regulation adopted by the State Council (effective in 2007) set out,
for each of four broad categories of vehicles, a range of specific duties (non-ad-valorum tax
amounts) based on the unit or weight of vehicles. 28 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and State
Administration of Taxation (SAT) were given the authority to prescribe more detailed
sub-categories and the appropriate range of tax amounts for them, and provincial people’s
governments were to prescribe the appropriate amounts of tax within the MOF/SAT-specified
ranges. After specifying further sub-categories of passenger vehicles for the VVT in 2007, 29
the MOF and SAT expected that their provincial counterparts (finance and tax bureaus) would
27

Allers and Elhorst reject expenditure and tax competitions as the cause of mimicking in property tax
rates in the Netherlands on similar grounds. See Allers and J. Elhorst, “Tax Mimicking and Yardstick
Competition among Local Governments in the Netherlands.”
28
Because the VVT is not ad valorum, its tax base depends not on the value of taxable vehicles but
simply their quantity, thus eliminating issues of discrepancy between nominal and effective tax rates.
29
Implementation Rules for the Provisional Regulations on the Vehicle and Vessel Tax (MOF and
SAT, published and effective on Feb. 1, 2007). According to our communication with MOF officials,
the range of taxable amounts for each taxable category were set in a two-step process: (i) a reference
amount was computed by multiplying a tax rate of 0.5%-1% to the average value of vehicles in the
category (the implicit tax rate is similar to property tax rates commonly observed internationally); and
(ii) degrees of variation around the reference point are allowed.
9

study appropriate tax rates for their respective jurisdictions, and make recommendations to
provincial people’s governments. 30
All provinces published VVT rates as well as other implementation measures between
April and December of 2007. We gathered the tax rates that resulted from these provincial
processes for the 31 provincial-level jurisdictions. Because there were 8 taxable categories,
there are 8 sets of rates, each set with 31 possible different values. A brief look at these rates
in Table 1 reveals that provincial choices were highly stylized and clustered. For each of the
sub-categories of taxable vehicles, a few discrete figures were chosen from a large number of
possible integer values. Many provinces chose identical rates. For example, for large
passenger vehicles, 31 provinces chose only 4 different rates, out of 180 possible integer
choices. Even for the category with the largest degree of rate variation, motorcycles, only 11
rates were chosen by 31 provinces (out of 144 possible integer values). Thus the rates were
unlikely to have been chosen based on specific revenue estimates. Table 2 also shows that for
most of the categories, provinces were hesitant to choose rates in the higher permissible
range. 31 On the other hand, there is no sign of across-the-board race to the bottom, either.
Only for three of the eight taxable categories, a majority of provinces chose rates in the lower
range of permissible rates.
Starting in 2007 and 2008, VVT revenue experienced dramatic growth in many
provinces (albeit starting from a low baseline), yet no province changed VVT rates up until
2011, when they were required to set VVT rates again as a result of the adoption of the VVT
Law. Given the informality of the rate-setting process and the simple administrative
requirements of the VVT (much of which is collected by insurance companies), rate changes
should have been easy to execute. It is likely that VVT tax policy simply did not have a place
on provincial government agendas.
In 2011, 25 provinces adopted VVT rates after deliberation of the relevant provincial
government’s executive committee, as compared to 16 in 2007. This suggests that VVT rate
setting received greater political attention in 2011. In terms of the tax rates actually adopted
(Table 2), provincial choices remain highly stylized and clustered: the degree of variation is
even slightly smaller than in 2007. The taxable categories for passenger vehicles in 2007 and
2011 are not directly comparable. For freight vehicles and motorcycles, however—where the
taxable categories in 2007 and 2011 are comparable—comparisons for each province (not
shown in Table 2) indicate that provinces generally chose lower rates than in 2007. This
occurred without the central government substantively altering the permissible rate range.
This lowering of rates may be explained, however, by factors other than tax competition. 32

30

MOF and SAT, Notice regarding Issues in the Implementation of the Provisional Regulations on the
Vehicle and Vessel Tax and Its Implementation Measures, Caishui [2007] 23, Feb. 8, 2007.
31
We divided the permissible rate range for each category evenly into three segments, designating
them as the low, medium and high segments of the range.
32
Professor Dong Xuebing suggests that for motorcycles, this may be attributable to the fact that they
are primarily used in rural areas and there has been an explicit government policy to lower tax rates in
general for the rural economy.
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The next section evaluates statistically the outcome of provincial VVT rate setting, by
examining both how the rates relate to certain economic and demographic variables and
whether there is inter-provincial strategic behavior. Local tax rates can be expected to bear
certain relations to local economic and social conditions that affect expenditure needs. If
Chinese VVT rates and provincial economic and social circumstances do not bear such
relations, the rates chosen can be said to be arbitrary in the following sense: the rates contain
no information regarding provincial conditions (even though utilizing such information in
rate-setting was the reason why rate-setting power was delegated to the provinces). The
possible presence of tax mimicking is also interesting because, as discussed in Section II, the
mechanisms that are generally viewed as responsible for tax mimicking in western
democracies are not operative in China, but mimicking may be explicable in terms of
bureaucratic shirking or political conformity in situations of indifference or insufficient
information.
IV. Data and Methodology
In analyzing the determinants of provincial VVT rate choices, we first adopt a simple
linear regression model:
(1)
T is a vector of tax rates adopted by different provinces, and X is a vector of independent
economic and demographic variables. In a second stage of our analysis, strategic behavior
among the provinces is tested, with the economic and demographic variables serving as
controls.
Dependent and independent variables
In specifying T, the dependent variable in the analysis, for both 2007 and 2011, we
aggregate the original sets of VVT rates into three sets: the first is the sum of the tax amounts
chosen by each province for the subcategories (4 in 2007 and 8 in 2011) of passenger vehicles;
the second is the sum of the tax amounts for freight vehicles, three-wheeled motor vehicles
and special-use vehicles; and the third is the tax amount chosen for motorcycles. This
aggregation produces a slightly greater number of values (thus more variation) across the
provinces than the original sets of tax rates display. 33 For each set of figures, we have 31
observations corresponding to the 31 provinces in 2007, for a total of 93 observations. Tibet
appears not to have issued any public document to implement the new VVT law in 2011 and
the new rates applicable in Tibet are unknown. Therefore we exclude Tibet from our analysis
of 2011 data, resulting in 30 and 90 observations, respectively, for the three sets of rates
individually and in aggregate.
Public finance theory does not offer any simple functional relationship that allows the
prediction of local tax rates from independent economic and demographic variables. Existing
studies have adopted overlapping sets of such variables, implying a general consensus about
33

We also performed separate analyses of the dis-aggregated tax rates for 2007 for robustness and
obtained consistent results (omitted from the presentation below but can be provided upon request).
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what factors are plausibly relevant. Commonly used variables include:
 Per capita disposable income: assuming publicly-provided services to be normal
goods, demand will rise as incomes rise. This has been taken as the basis for
expecting higher income to lead to higher tax rates (in order to finance higher levels
of public services).
 The relative size of the elderly and youth populations in the jurisdiction: the
hypothesis, generally confirmed, is that higher proportions of such age groups result
in higher tax rates because they increase the need for public expenditures.
 Some, although not all, studies use the urbanization rate (urban population as a
percentage of total population), presumably on the ground that a higher urbanization
rate gives rise to higher public expenditures and thus higher tax rates. 34
 Some studies have found population to be positively correlated with tax rate,
supporting the theory that greater demand for public services is observed in more
populous jurisdictions. However, others find a negative coefficient for population
variable, supposedly explained by an increasing return in public goods provision. 35
 Some posit a positive correlation between area and tax rates, reflecting costlier
public goods provision in a larger area. 36
 Per capita grant from higher levels of government: a positive sign could be
interpreted as illustrating the “flypaper effect.” 37
For our regression, we use the following independent variables:
1. population;
2. area;
3. urbanization rate (the ratio of urban residents over the total population in a
province);
4. urban per capita disposable income;
5. dependent ratio the percentage of children and the elderly in a given population);
6. transfers from the central government the population-averaged subsidy from
national government received by each province), and
7. a dummy variable, “rate setting agency”, which is assigned the value of 1 if VVT
rules (which contain VVT rates) were adopted by the executive committee of the
provincial government, and is 0 otherwise (i.e. if rates were chosen merely by
provincial tax agencies). Our hypothesis is that the review by the provincial
government executive committee would lower the tax rates eventually chosen: tax
34

See M. Bordignon, F. Cerniglia and F. Revelli, “In Search of Yardstick competition: a Spatial
Analysis of Italian Municipal Property Tax Setting,” Journal of Urban Economics 54 (2003): 199-217.
A significant positive correlation between gross tax burden on foreign direct investment and
urbanization rate is found in the Chinese context; see Yang and Xu, “The Strategic Character and
Impact on Economic Growth of Chinese Local Government Tax Competition for FDI.”
35
For the former results, see Delgado et al, “On the Determinants of Local Tax Rates;” for the latter,
see Bordignon et al, “In Search of Yardstick competition,” and F. Delgado and M. Mayor, “Tax
Mimicking among Local Governments: Some Evidence from Spanish Municipalities,” Port Econ J 10
(2011): 149–164
36
See Bordignon et al, “In Search of Yardstick competition”.
37
The “flypaper effect” refers to the phenomenon that a government transfer to a local authority can
lead to a higher increase in local governmental spending than an increase in local income of an
equivalent size
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bureaucrats are more likely to propose higher tax rates whereas generalist politicians
have incentives to temper such proposals.
Moreover, for 2011, we include as an independent variable the tax rate adopted by each
province in 2007 (in the relevant category): we hypothesize that, other things equal, a
province that chose higher tax rates in 2007 would also choose higher tax rates in 2011. Table
3 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.
OLS estimation; issues of spatial dependence
We first run a conventional OLS estimation of the dependent variables as linear functions
of the independent variables. As seen in Table 4, in both 2007 and 2011, most of the
independent variables of interest attain no statistical significance in predicting tax rates. The
main correlations confirmed are that, for freight vehicles and motorcycles, 2011 rates are
positively and significantly correlated with 2007 rates. For passenger vehicle rates, the
correlation is positive, though not significant (which is consistent with the substantial
overhaul of the rate structure in this taxable category). In 2007, the “rate setting agency”
dummy had a uniform negative effect on all three sets of tax rates, with the correlation for
passenger vehicles weakly significant. This supports our hypothesis that approval by
politicians as opposed to technocrats would lower tax rates. But the effect disappears in 2011.
The other statistically significant relations from the OLS estimation have unexpected
signs. In 2007, the disposable income and dependency ratio variables have a negative impact
on some tax rates. In 2011, a negative correlation is found between dependency ratio and
passenger vehicle rates. These correlations are contrary to the findings of determinants of
local tax rates in the international literature. While these results may be viewed as
uninformative or even counter-intuitive from the perspective of traditional public finance
theory, they are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that provinces choose tax rates arbitrarily.
Nevertheless, there are reasons not to draw any immediate conclusions from the OLS
estimation based on Equation (1). As discussed in Section II, spatial dependence has often
been found in local tax rates. If there is spatial dependence for VVT rates as well, the normal
OLS is not suitable for model testing because either coefficients or standard errors or both are
distorted by the spatial effect. 38 The estimation could be biased and/or inconsistent. Since it is
our intention to test for the presence of strategic interactions among provincial governments
in VVT rate setting, and since such interactions may manifest themselves in spatial patterns,
modeling for such interactions also allows us to confirm the results regarding the explanatory
variables in the initial OLS estimation.
Two statistical models commonly used for analyzing the effect of spatial dependence are
the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model and the spatial error model (SEM). The SAR model is
intended to capture “substantive” spatial dependence, in the sense that the value of a variable
at a given location depends on values of the variable in its “neighbors” of interest. The model
38

L. Anselin, Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp.
58-9.
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can be expressed through Equation (2):
(2)
Equation (2) expresses the idea that the tax rate of a given region, ti, is influenced by the
tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions (and vice versa). This spatial dependence is captured by
the variable WT on the right-hand side, where W is a pre-specified spatial weights matrix. The
(i,j) entry of the matrix is non-zero if jurisdictions i and j are “neighbors” in some pre-defined
sense; the diagonal entries are zero by convention; and rows are standardized to 1 (i.e. the row
elements are divided by their sum). WT should thus be a vector representing, for each
jurisdiction, the average tax rates of its neighbors. ρ would measure the degree of spatial
correlation.
In the SEM model, the spatial dependence is the result of spatial autocorrelation in the
error term of Equation (1):

（3）
The idea of Equation (3) is that certain omitted variables that may influence tax rates are
spatially auto-correlated. For example, unobserved shocks could play a role in determining
tax rates across the contiguous regions.
The estimation of both models faces significant statistical problems. To deal with the
problems, existing literature generally relies on two methods: maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) and a two-stage least square (2SLS) model using instrumental variables. The MLE is
considered more appropriate for small-sized samples, 39 and we use it here.
In addition, there are several diagnostic tests for the existence of spatial dependence.
These include the traditional Moran’s I test, a modified “Moran’s Error” test and certain
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests performed on the residuals of an OLS estimation. 40 The
application of these tests, as well as the SAR and SEM models discussed above, all depend on
the choice of an appropriate contiguity matrix describing the spatial relations among
jurisdictions. We use a contiguity matrix where the (i,j) entry of the matrix is non-zero if
provinces i and j share a common border. The results of the application of these diagnostic
tests to 2007 and 2011 VVT rates are reported in Table 5.
As Table 5 exhibits, although not all tests yield the same results, the Moran’s I test and
Moran’s Error test offer evidence of spatial correlation for tax rates for both passenger
vehicles and motorcycles. On the other hand, no spatial dependence (based on the contiguity
measure of common borders) is found for the aggregate tax rates for freight vehicles. In other
words, for freight vehicles, the conclusion from the OLS estimation that the choice of rates
bears no detectable relation to the independent variables should be free from bias or
39

D. Das, H. H. Kelejian and I. R. Prucha, “Finite Sample Properties of Spatial Autoregressive Models
with Autoregressive Disturbances,” Papers in Regional Science, 82 (2003): 1-26.
40
For Moran’s Error, see Cliff, A. and J.K. Ord. 1981. Spatial Processes: Models and Applications
(London: Pion, 1981). For the LM test using OLS residuals, see P. Burridge, “On the Cliff-Ord test for
Spatial Autocorrelation," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 42 (1980): 107-108.
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inconsistency due to spatial auto-correlation. In the following, we explore whether taking
spatial autocorrelation into account could better explain the choice of tax rates for passenger
vehicles and motorcycles. Following the international literature, we estimate using both the
SAR and SEM models, and rely on various statistical measures to determine which of the two
models offer better explanations.
V. Evidence of Strategic Interactions and Its Interpretation
The results from our MLE estimation are reported in Table 6. Consider first the results
for passenger vehicle rates. In 2007, the SAR model yields no evidence of spatial dependence.
The coefficient of correlation between the tax rates of a given province and those of its
bordering provinces, ρ, is positive but not statistically significant. The rest of the SAR
estimation results are consistent with the OLS estimation. Only the “rate setting agency”
dummy and the dependency ratio have a statistically significant impact on the dependent
variable. However, spatial dependence does show up under the SEM estimation for 2007,
since λ achieves the statistical significance at 95% level. The signs of the coefficients for the
control variables remain the same as under the OLS and SAR estimations, but their statistical
significance is accentuated. More surprisingly, a negative coefficient of spatial correlation (λ
is negative) suggests that a 1 unit increase in the omitted unknown variable in adjacent regions
results in 0.98 unit decreases in passenger vehicle rates. 41
The results for 2011 are more straightforward. Both the SAR and SEM models produce
positive and statistically significant spatial coefficients. In the current literature, the LM and
Robust LM tests are used to choose between the SAR and SEM models. 42 Table 5 shows that
both tests support that the spatial lag effect is stronger than is spatial error effect. Therefore
we conclude that substantive spatial dependence characterizes the choice of tax rates here.
Under the SAR model, a 1-unit increase in the average rate of a given province’s neighbors
leads to a 0.45 unit increase in that province’s rate. Moreover, the coefficients for the control
variables are also largely consistent with the results under the OLS estimation for passenger
vehicle rates in 2011. In particular, the dependency ratio is still significantly and negatively
correlated with the tax rate, while the other variables bear no statistically significant relations
to tax rates.
Turning now to motorcycle tax rates, in both 2007 and 2011, there is strong evidence of
spatial dependence. The SAR and SEM models yield results that are mutually consistent and
consistent with the OLS results. Again, on the basis of both LM and Robust LM test (Table 5)
and the estimation comparison (ρ vs. λ in Table 6), we favor the SAR model and the
“substantive” spatial dependence explanation of spatial correlations. The SAR estimation
indicates that a 1-unit increase in tax rates in neighboring provinces contributes to 0.46 (2007)
and 0.63 (2011) unit increase in the rate in the home province. The coefficients are significant
41

We speak of units instead of yuans in connection with tax rates because our dependent variable for
passenger vehicles is the sum of tax amounts for multiple categories. For motorcycles, the units are
yuans. For SEM estimations, the meaning of a unit for the unknown variable is also unknown.
42
See F. Revelli, “Testing the Tax Mimicking vs. Expenditure Spill-over Hypothesis Using English
Data”; Delgado and Mayor, “Tax Mimicking among Local Governments.”
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in both years.
In terms of the other variables, 2011 tax rates are significantly positively correlated with
2007 tax rates for motorcycles: other things equal, the provinces that chose higher rates in
2007 also chose higher rates in 2011 (despite the general reduction of motorcycle tax rates
across the country). However, there is no other consistent predictor of tax rates; the
coefficients for population, urbanization rate, disposal income, and dependency ratio variables
all changed signs between 2007 and 2011.
The foregoing findings are complex and require discussion in terms of both internal
consistency and the plausibility of alternative explanations. First, in respect of consistency, we
find support for the tax mimicking hypothesis—provinces consider the tax rates that may be
chosen by geographical neighbors in setting their own tax rates—for passenger vehicles in
2011, and for motorcycles for both 2007 and 2011. However, for passenger vehicles in 2007,
there is no evidence of tax mimicking, even though an anomalous type of spatial dependence
due to omitted variables seems to exist (i.e. a rise in neighbors’ tax rates leads to a decrease in
one’s own tax rates). Moreover, for freight vehicle rates, there is evidence for neither tax
mimicking nor spatial dependence due to omitted variables. There is no intuitive reason why
provinces would copy their neighbors with respect to motorcycle tax rates but not with
respect to passenger or freight vehicles. Findings of “selective” tax mimicking are not
unprecedented, 43 but no explanation for this phenomenon has been offered in the existing
literature.
Overall, our inability to find evidence of tax mimicking across all VVT categories
diminishes our willingness to embrace the idea that there is strategic interaction among
provinces in VVT rate-setting. Nonetheless, our modeling for spatial interactions increases
our confidence in the regression results with respect to the economic and demographic
explanatory variables. No inconsistency in estimation for these variables has emerged among
the OLS, SAR and SEM models.
Turning now to matters of interpretation, two aspects of our empirical findings are
significant: (1) the limited finding of tax mimicking; and (2) the finding that the major
economic and demographic variables do not predict tax rates chosen (or, in the case of
dependency ratio, offers a counter-intuitive prediction). With respect to the first finding,
(despite the caveat stated in the two preceding paragraphs) one might view even the limited
evidence of mimicking as significant. The question then is what explains such evidence. As
discussed in Section II, the two most plausible explanations in the Chinese context would be
tax competition and political conformity/bureaucratic shirking. For motorcycle tax rates,
where we find strong evidence of tax mimicking, the fact that the rates chosen by provinces
43

In studying tax rates in 105 municipalities near Barcelona, Solé-Ollé finds significant positive
response of property and vehicle tax rates to changes in neighbors’ rates, but weak evidence for
mimicking in a third local tax. See A. Solé-Ollé, “Electoral Accountability and Tax Mimicking.”
Delgado and Mayor examine 78 municipalities in the Asturias region and find tax mimicking with
respect to the property tax and building activities tax, but not the motor vehicle tax. See Delgado, and
Mayor, “Tax Mimicking among Local Governments”.
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generally decreased from 2007 to 2011 may seem to favor the tax competition explanation.
But it may be explained by other policy factors as well. 44 Moreover, for passenger vehicles,
tax mimicking in 2011 is not accompanied by any sign of tax competition.
By contrast, the hypothesis that provincial officials acted out of conformism and
indifference in choosing VVT rates can be viewed as supported by whatever degree of tax
mimicking there is, and by other types of evidence as well. Such other evidence includes:
(i) the stylized and clustered tax rate choices made in both 2007 and 2011: for all taxable
categories, every province’s choice is matched by an identical choice by at least two
other provinces, and by as many as six other provinces;
(ii) the fact that no province bothered to change VVT rates after 2007 until they had to, in
2011, due to national legislation; and
(iii) tax rate choices bore no significant relationship to the provinces’ levels of economic
development (as represented by per capita disposable income and urbanization ratio),
fiscal needs (as represented by the dependency ratio, urbanization ratio, and per capita
transfers from the central government) and other demographic variables.
That is, evidence of types (i) to (iii) may be interpreted as showing that provinces took an
arbitrary approach to VVT rate setting—introducing no new information into the rates
chosen—even if there is no evidence of strategic interactions in rate setting. Any further
evidence showing such strategic interaction would only support such interpretation.
Our interpretation is perhaps most controversial in respect of item (iii). We have only
found that certain variables have no noticeable impact on the choice of VVT rates. It seems
rushed to infer from this that no important policy consideration has impact on rate
choice—that the choice of VVT rates is arbitrary from all policy perspectives. But this is not
our claim. Instead, we identified certain factors that have been found in other studies (Chinese
and international) to be relevant determinants of local tax rates. Moreover, these factors are
good proxies for a wide range of factors relevant to policymaking. We cannot, of course, rule
out that some omitted variable may have determined VVT rate choices.
Overall, our investigation has revealed that in setting tax rates for the VVT, Chinese
provincial governments may have engaged in tax mimicking in respect to passenger vehicles
(which represent 87% of the total number of vehicles in China) and motorcycles. Moreover,
both when they engaged in such mimicking and when they did not, no other significant policy
factors seemed to affect rate choice. Both of these findings suggest that provincial
governments lacked information and/or incentives to set rates effectively. Provincial choices
offer no improvement, in terms of incorporating local information, over what the central
government would have chosen. Ironically, by delegating rate-setting authority to provincial
governments, the central government clearly expected such improvement.
VI. Theoretical and Policy Implications
For students of federalism and decentralized governance, that centralized
44

See note 20 supra.
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decision-making can be inefficient is a familiar idea and may even seem a priori. Our analysis
of provincial tax rate setting confirms this longstanding notion but introduces one novel
insight in the Chinese context: provincial decision-making can be an instance of
over-centralized decision-making. We believe this insight is important: it challenges at least
two conventional assumptions in discourses about China, both of which, we suspect, result
from an unreflective acceptance of Chinese legislative centralization.
First, provincial and sub-provincial governments are often lumped together in scholarly
and policy discourses and treated all as “local”. In literatures on governance and
decentralization elsewhere in the world, the term “local government” tends unambiguously to
refer to the lowest levels of government (i.e. towns and municipalities). Yet in discourses
about China, the term becomes highly ambiguous and could refer to any of the four levels of
subnational government. This ambiguity can be seriously misleading: probably only in China
would it go unquestioned (by everyone) that legislation for a tax administered and used only
by sub-provincial governments should be conducted by the national parliament, and that
sub-provincial governments should be entirely excluded from lawmaking regarding such a tax.
Such equivocations not only breed considerable inaccuracy but also would have precluded the
identification of the kind of phenomena investigated in this paper. We have tried to show that
“provincial” may not equal “local”, not just as a semantic but also as a substantive matter.
Moreover, we suggest that it is perhaps only because the monopoly on legislation by the
national and provincial governments in a wide range of policy areas is casually assumed that
one can easily elide the distinctions among provincial and sub-provincial levels of
policymaking.
Second, current discourses in the Chinese context almost inevitably equate law with
centralized law. The law is what the central government announces, whereas “real
practice”—enforcement or non-enforcement, compliance or non-compliance—is what
happens “locally”. Whereas the distinction between the law on paper and the law in practice
holds everywhere in the world, in China that distinction is often aligned with the
“central/local” distinction. This has even led some to postulate a conflict between
decentralized experimentation and the rule of law. For example, Professor Chenggang Xu
emphasizes initiatives taken by “local governments” as crucial to the path of Chinese
economic reform, repeatedly pointing out that lower levels of government had to break
existing law adopted by the central government to push forward reform. 45 The implication is
that there may be a necessary trade-off between decentralization and the rule of law. 46 Yet
this trade-off is spurious and a mere artifact of the Chinese discourse: the need for sacrificing
the rule of law would go away if local governments could themselves legislate. Why should
the central government (and provincial governments) have a monopoly over legislative power?
If, as we have shown, provincial policy-making can be inefficiently centralized in some
important cases, national policy-making would of course be even more inefficient (and in
45

Chenggang Xu, "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development." Journal of
Economic Literature, 49 (2011): 1076-1151.
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International Development Working Paper No. 172, 2008).
18

even more cases).
The passive acceptance of law as centralized law may have also led many to accept that
law, if not an obstacle to reform, has had—and may continue to have—a limited role to play
in Chinese economic development. 47 Since the 1980s, scholars on China have managed to
neglect the incongruity between legislative centralization and administrative decentralization
by treating legislative centralization as a mere “formal” feature of the Chinese polity, while in
the meantime viewing shifting “center-local” relations, and especially administrative
decentralization, as the main, substantive theme in contemporary Chinese governance.48
Since law originated from the center while reform occurred in the localities, the marginality
of law to reform appears inevitable. However, a contrary view is that the law was quite
important in many areas of policy implementation during China’s reform era, 49 but it may
have been prevented from playing a greater role because of centralization. To put it differently,
instead of seeing the law as necessarily centralized but only contingently helpful for
development, it may be that economic reform in China could have benefitted from relying
more on legal mechanisms (much as traditional views of law and development hold), and that
what is historically contingent was the centralization of law. This view is supported by the
basic fact that, as discussed in the Introduction, the high level of legislative centralization in
China is very unusual by international standards. In an obvious sense, this fact requires
explanation. Our analysis of provincial tax rating emphasizes this need, by showing the
national and provincial monopoly on legislation in China to be the outlier that it really should
be viewed as, instead of as the norm.
Our study also has important policy ramifications. For example, recent arguments for
levying a modern property tax in China have assumed that the property tax burden can be
raised or lowered according to local expenditure needs. However, that relatively few
sub-provincial governments have the authority to set tax rates of any kind means that it is
currently legally impossible for many of the benefits of a local property tax to be realized.
That is, arguments for the adoption of the property tax in China on the basis that it can serve
as a benefit tax—as the property tax has in other parts of the world—have little grounding in
China’s current legal system. The failure to recognize the pernicious effects of
over-centralization is likely to have led to other erroneous recommendations. We believe that
47

That is, many who study Chinese political economy probably implicitly reject the view that the rule
of law is crucial for economic development.
48
Examples of earlier scholars casting the briefest glance at “formal” centralization before turning to
“more substantive” decentralization include Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, “The Evolution of
Central-provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: the Formal System," The China Quarterly
125 (1991): 1-32. Christine P Wong, “Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic
Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China,” Modern China 18 (1992): 197-227. Leading theories
subsequently developed have presented Chinese political economy in the reform era as embodying the
paradigm of decentralization. See, e.g. Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast, “Regional
Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style,” Journal of Public Economics 89
(2005): 1719-1742.
49
For example, during an era of lack of regulatory capacity, the criminalization of activities that
undermine the state’s economy policy may have served as an important legal tool in implementing such
policy. For an initial exploration of this idea in connection with tax administration, see Wei Cui, “The
Historical Origin of Tax Legislative Centralization, Peking University Law Journal (English), 1 (2013):
105-131.
19

identifying such effects is crucial for both positive and normative inquiries regarding the
Chinese polity. 50

50
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Table 1 2007 VVT Rates

Taxable category

Large passenger vehicles
(PV)
Medium PV
Small PV
Mini PV
Freight
3-wheel or low-speed
Special use
Motorcycles

Rate Range Set by
Central Government (in
Yuan)

Number of Different Rates Adopted among All
Provinces

No. of Provinces Choosing
Rates in the
Low/Medium/High Segments
of Allowable Range

480-660

4（600, 580, 540, 480）

7/11/13

420 -660
360-660
60-480
16-120
24-120
16-120
36-180

8（550, 540, 516, 510, 500, 480, 450, 420）
6（600, 480, 450, 420, 400, 360）
8（360, 300, 280, 260, 240, 180, 120, 60）
6（96, 90, 84, 80, 72, 60）
9（96, 90, 84, 80, 72, 60, 50, 48, 24）
8（96, 90, 84, 80, 72, 60, 56, 36）
11（180, 120, 100, 96, 72, 84, 80, 60, 48, 40, 36）

20/11/0
24/7/0
8/20/3
0/19/12
5/21/5
2/21/8
24/6/1

21

Table 2 2011 VVT Rates

Taxable category
Passenger vehicles*:
class a
class b
Class c
Class d
Class e
Class f
Class g
Class h
class i
Freight vehicles
Special operation vehicle
Special wheeled and
mechanized vehicles
Motorcycles

Rate Range Set by
Central Government (in
Yuan)

Number of Different Rates Adopted among All
Provinces

No. of Provinces Choosing
Rates in the
Low/Medium/High Segments
of Allowable Range

60-360

6（60, 120, 180, 240, 270, 300）

9/16/5

300-540
360-660
660-1200
1200-2400
2400-3600
3600-5400
480-1440

24/6/0
23/7/0
22/8/0
11/20/0
8/21/1
8/21/1

480-1440
12-120
16-120

4（300, 360, 390, 420）
5（360, 390, 420, 450, 480）
5（660, 720, 780, 840, 900）
4（1200, 1500, 1800, 1920）
6（2400, 2640, 2700, 3000, 3120, 3480）
6（3600, 3900, 4200, 4500, 4800, 5280）
9（540, 600, 660, 720, 900, 960, 1020, 1140,
1200）
9（480, 500, 510, 516，540, 600, 720, 900, 960）
6（60, 72, 80, 84, 90, 96）
6（30, 36, 40, 42, 45, 48）

16-120

7（36, 56, 60, 72, 80, 84, 96）

1/22/7

36-180

7（36, 40, 60, 72, 80, 84, 96）

2/21/7

20/7/3
24/6/0
0/22/8
0/22/8

* Passenger vehicles were divided into 6 categories of consumer automobiles based on emission-level and 2 categories of commercial automobiles based on
size, and the tax is imposed on a per vehicle basis. Thus the tax rates (as well as their sum) are not comparable to 2007 passenger vehicle rates.
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for 2007 and 2011*
Variables

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

Mean

2007

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2011

Passenger (in Yuan)

31

1688.58

186.19

1320.00

2030.00

30

11883.87

1277.20

9660.00

14880.00

Freight (in Yuan)

31

286.52

60.51

168.00

384.00

30

219.13

47.69

144.00

288.00

Motorcycle (in Yuan)

31

71.10

30.35

36.00

180.00

30

53.87

21.57

36.00

120.00

31

4189.97

2693.48

284.00

9449.00

30

4432.60

2707.16

563.00

10430.00

Area (ten thousand Km )

31

31.00

38.57

0.63

166.49

30

28.03

35.44

0.63

166.49

Urbanization Rate (%)

31

47.35

14.85

28.24

88.70

30

51.02

14.44

30.94

88.90

Disposable Income (in Yuan)

31

11363.70

3294.46

8871.30

20667.90

30

18170.60

4825.79

13188.55

31838.08

Rate-setting Agency

31

0.52

0.51

0.00

1.00

30

0.83

0.38

0.00

1.00

Dependency Ratio (%)

31

37.47

6.69

24.72

55.09

30

33.91

7.08

20.95

51.03

Central Transfers (in Yuan)

31

1502.55

1238.33

571.00

7317.96

30

1083.01

490.35

319.00

2600.06

Population (ten thousand)
2

* Data for central transfers (for 2006 and 2010) comes from the China Fiscal Yearbook. Data for urban disposal income in 2007 and 2010 comes from the
CEIC database and provincial statistical bulletins, respectively. Data for population, area, and dependency ratios comes from the China's Statistical Yearbook
(2008 and 2011).
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Table 4 Results from OLS
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Passenger

Freight

Motorcycle

Passenger

Freight

Motorcycle

2007

2011

2007 Values of Dependent Variables

Population (ten thousand)

0.79

0.35**

0.40**

(1.43)

(0.14)

(0.17)

-0.01

0.01

0.00

-0.10

-0.00

-0.00

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.14)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-1.07

-0.28

-0.04

0.32

-0.04

-0.02

(1.01)

(0.38)

(0.18)

(7.08)

(0.25)

(0.12)

3.44

2.82

1.54

7.32

0.31

-0.39

(5.80)

(2.18)

(1.01)

(22.94)

(0.85)

(0.45)

-0.03*

-0.01*

-0.00

-0.06

-0.00

0.00

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.08)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-128.17*

-8.17

-5.21

-197.71

4.84

2.56

(69.06)

(25.91)

(11.98)

(478.72)

(17.03)

(8.71)

-21.46**

-2.54

-0.57

-121.97**

-2.47

0.57

(8.63)

(3.24)

(1.50)

(50.50)

(1.67)

(0.77)

-0.01

0.01

0.01

0.88

0.02

0.00

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.79)

(0.03)

(0.01)

2,846.52***

371.63

32.21

14,937.19***

178.86

-5.50

(578.46)

(217.05)

(100.39)

(4,563.66)

(123.39)

(51.80)

31

31

31

30

30

30

R-squared

0.48

0.31

0.41

0.48

0.53

0.43

F test

0.019

0.22

0.06

0.05

0.02

0.09

2

Area (ten thousand Km )

Urbanization Rate (%)

Disposable Income (in Yuan)

Rate-setting Agency

Dependency Ratio (%)

Central Transfers (in Yuan)

Constant

Observations

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5 Moran’s I Test, Moran’s Error and LM Tests for 2007 and 2011

Passenger

Freight
Moran’s I
Motorcycle

Passenger

Freight
Moran’s Error
Motorcycle

Passenger

Freight
LM-error
Motorcycle

Passenger

Freight
Robust LM-error

2007

2011

0.35***

0.36***

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.07

0.06

(0.20)

(0.22)

0.36***

0.37***

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.32

2.26**

(0.75)

(0.02)

0.20

0.26

(0.84)

(0.80)

3.22***

3.55***

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.13

1.66

(0.71)

(0.20)

0.63

0.58

(0.43)

(0.45)

4.07**

5.52**

(0.04)

(0.02)

2.49

0.18

(0.11)

(0.67)

0.08

2.17

(0.78)

(0.14)

25

Motorcycle

Passenger

Freight

Motorcycle
LM-lag
Passenger

Freight
Robust LM-lag
Motorcycle

0.06

0.91

(0.81)

(0.34)

0.09

3.05*

(0.77)

(0.08)

0.55

0.01

(0.46)

(0.93)

4.29**

6.78***

(0.04)

(0.01)

2.45

1.57

(0.12)

(0.21)

0.00

1.60

(0.98)

(0.21)

0.28

2.17

(0.60)

(0.14)

*, **, ***significant at 90%, 95%, and 99%. P-values are in parentheses.
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Table 6 SAR and SEM for PV and Motorcycles, 2007 and 2011

VARIABLES

Passenger

Motorcycle

Passenger

Motorcycle

2007
SAR

SEM

2011
SAR

SEM

2007 Values of Dependent Variables

Population (ten thousand)

2

Area (ten thousand Km )

Rate of Urban Population (%)

Disposable Income (in Yuan)

Rule-setting Agency

Dependency ratio (%)

Transfer from Central Government (in Yuan)

Constant

rho

SAR

SEM

SAR

SEM

0.42

-0.59

0.29**

0.27*

(1.11)

(1.03)

(0.12)

(0.15)

-0.01

-0.04***

0.00

0.00

-0.10

-0.12

-0.00

-0.00*

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.11)

(0.08)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.98

-2.65***

-0.06

-0.03

-2.09

-9.54**

-0.11

-0.10

(0.90)

(1.03)

(0.14)

(0.12)

(5.56)

(4.36)

(0.09)

(0.10)

3.29

1.02

1.32*

1.13*

-3.05

-18.79

-0.38

-0.33

(4.99)

(4.42)

(0.79)

(0.67)

(18.29)

(12.34)

(0.31)

(0.30)

-0.03

-0.05***

-0.00

-0.00

0.01

0.14**

0.00

0.00

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-123.89**

-118.08***

-10.75

-18.78*

-246.10

-175.23

-0.96

-3.39

(60.39)

(44.04)

(9.62)

(10.40)

(368.23)

(262.16)

(6.17)

(6.45)

-19.77**

-26.38***

-0.38

-1.13

-104.68***

-110.53***

0.08

-0.09

(8.69)

(5.59)

(1.17)

(1.29)

(39.63)

(33.96)

(0.56)

(0.73)

-0.00

-0.02

0.01**

0.01**

1.10*

1.18**

0.00

0.01

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.62)

(0.46)

(0.01)

(0.01)

2,558.23***

3,513.78***

-3.05

78.93

9,033.02**

14,897.72***

5.30

37.05

(922.50)

(391.12)

(79.53)

(83.48)

(4,487.70)

(2,783.55)

(36.34)

(47.34)

0.10

0.46**

0.43**

0.64***

27

(0.28)
lamda

(0.20)

(0.21)

(0.19)

-0.98***

0.62***

0.86***

0.57**

(0.24)

(0.18)

(0.10)

(0.26)

Squared corr.

.487

0.366

0.524

0.339

0.565

0.167

0.613

0.387

sigma

131.16***

109.01***

20.63***

19.47***

829.35***

661.73***

13.32***

14.49***

(16.68)

(15.47)

(2.68)

(2.58)

(109.15)

(92.63)

(1.82)

(1.99)

31

31

31

31

30

30

30

30

Observations

*, **, ***significant at 90%, 95%, and 99%. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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